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Overview
• My background in social science
• Brief introduction to four bodies of literature:
1. Wicked problems
2. Participatory democracy
3. Social psychology of risk and decision making
4. Institutional design for common property 
resource management
• Synthesis: Who sits at the Table?
Arctic Ocean Management is a 
“Wicked Problem”
The problem of balancing multiple uses is: 
• Ill-defined: plurality of perspectives; no set alternatives
• Novel: emerging technologies, changing environment, 
dynamic social, legal and political demands; path dependent
• Complex: common property; social and ecological 
interdependencies, technical complexities and scientific 
uncertainties; interdependencies of stakeholders with 
differing views and values, and multiple organizations at 
different levels
• No final solution: interactive and adaptive
• No right or wrong: only better or worse
Engaging Collective Intelligence
• Wicked problems are too complex to be 
resolved by modern, technocratic decision-
making 
• Better solutions engage collective intelligence 
across all knowledge holders
• Better solutions are reached through 
extended, face to face, facilitated dialog
Participatory Democracy
• Participatory and deliberative methods of 
decision-making promote equitable solutions 
to resource conflicts
• Effective participation includes:
– Substantive input about processes as well as 
outcomes
– Consideration of preferences of all stakeholders
– Mechanisms for reaching compromises and 
resolving conflict
– Capacity to recognize and correct error
Challenges for Design
– Representation: open-ended stakeholder self-
identification and inclusion
– Institutional design: unique to environment ; 
adaptive; 
– Problem articulation: recognize multiplicity of 
perspectives
Some Design Elements
• Local actors who depend on the ecosystem 
have the most at stake - internalize externalities
• Local knowledge, perspective and resources 
are fundamental to problem solving 
• Indigenous peoples with cultural, legal, 
historic, and geographic ties to the ecosystem 
warrant special status
The Social Psychology of Risk
• Risk is subjective
– Risk = ƒ(frequency, severity, values, perception)
• Perception is (in part) a social construct
– Framing: loss or gain?
– Salience: emotionally charged recent experience?
– Process of engagement: cues from context
• Systematic cognitive biases and limitations
– e.g. Myopia, impatience, excessive discounting, 
loss aversion
Managing Risks Across 
Stakeholders and Cultures (Weber 2010)
• Provide institutions that allow people to overcome 
cognitive and emotional shortcomings
• Use context to prime appropriate decision goals and 
values 
– Know your audience (and its segments)
– Multiplicity of goals: Goals that are active at the time determine 
decisions
– Activation levels partly chronic (culture), partly situational
– Goals can be primed by choice context: locale, symbols, sequencing
• Group context primes cooperation and longer time 
horizons
Design Principles for Effective 
Common Property Institutions 
(Ostrom 1990)
1. Clear boundaries and membership - who has 
rights to share the benefits must be clearly defined
2. Congruent rules - the rules for providing and 
appropriating benefits must fit the conditions
3. Collective choice arenas - most individuals 
affected by the rules can participate in modifying 
the rules
Design Principles cont.
4. Conflict resolution mechanisms
– all parties have ready access to arenas to resolve conflicts
5. Nested units
– appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict 
resolution, and governance activities are organized in 
multiple layers of nested institutions, such that…
– The scope of the unit matches the scope of the problem
6. Monitoring
7. Graduated sanctions
8. Recognized rights to organize
Who sits at the table?
• Key stakeholders
– Stake: potential costs and benefits
– Power: authority and influence
– Public interest
• Scale
– Span the scope of the problem
– Diverse expertise
• Legitimacy
– Representation, accountability, transparency and 
capacity
Conclusions and Recommendations
• One size does NOT fit all
→ be flexible and adapt to local conditions and 
institutions
• Each LME in Alaska is unique ecologically, 
sociologically and institutionally
→ Create regional CMSP boards
• State of Alaska does not effectively represent 
the spectrum of local interests, knowledge, 
resources and capacities for planning and 
action
Conclusions and Recommendations cont.
• Federally recognized tribes in Alaska are small, 
village-based entities with no land title or 
resource management authority or capacity.
• Marine mammal co-management commissions 
represent the best indigenous knowledge about 
Arctic ecosystems and subsistence practices
→Develop partnerships that include boroughs 
and co-management organizations on an 
equal footing with state and federal agencies
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